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An Overview of Agricultural Household Models: Theory 
a:>stract 
'!his paper is one of two introductory, survey chapters for a book, 
Jlericultural ·HousehQ.ld.Models; · :Exten~_,_wpli¢ations ·aoo_P.Q~, being 
coedited by Inderjit Singh, Lyn Squire and John Strauss for the World Bani<. 
'l'he paper corrpares and contrasts differing theoretical m:x:lels of an agricultural 
household, which have heretofore beP.n presented as alternative, unrelated 
nooels. 'llle essential characteristics of an agricultural household is the 
interlinkage of its consunption and production decisions. How these decisions 
are related depends crucially on how markets are m:x:leled. In particular whether 
. 
a household's production and consurrption decisions are separable becomes very 
inportant in this context. This is spelled out, and nooels correspoooing to 
several assurrptions are examined. 'l'hese include IOOdels with no labor narket, 
Z-9oods nooels, IOOdels with certain types of ccomrodity heterogeneity, as well 
as m:>dels with perfect narkets. In the a.'lalysis their relationships to each. 
other are stressed. 
An Overview of Agricultural Household Hodels: Theon· * 
I. Introduction 
The study of agricultural households is important for understanding 
the effects of various types of public interventions at both the household 
and aggregate levels. Agricultural, or farm, households are different 
from traditional economic households because they produce some of the 
commodities that they consume, and they supply some or all of the labor 
used on the farm. 1 Thus the concept covers a continuum of households, 
ranging from those which are purely subsistence, consuming virtually 
all their output and not buying or selling labor, to those which are 
commercial, selling all their output, but which use family (and perhaps 
hired) labor to produce it. 
These households are a major form of economic organization in developing 
countries. Roughly seventy percent of the labor force in low income 
developing countries was employed in the agricultural sector in 1980, 
while roughly forty-five percent of the middle income developing countries' 
labor force was so employed (Table 1). While not all the agricultural 
labor force is comprised of farm household members, some are landless 
laborers, Table 1 clearly suggests that such households are very numerous. 
Consequently it is important to account for their behavior as economic 
actors when analyzing government interventions into the economy. 
Governments in developing countries impose interventions which affect 
and are affected by farm households. Policies affecting prices of agricultural 
commodities and inputs are pervasive (for sample~ see T. W. Schultz, 
1978). Such policies may be designed to influence production, marketing, 
consumption or trade, and may be designed to provide.revenue, encourage 
industrialization, mitigate other price distortions, and so on. Perhaps 
the most common of these policies are trade policies ciP~igned to promote 
* 
I am indebted to Lyn Squire, 1. J. Sinr.h, Jon Skinner, Sylvia Lane, 
arid David Trechter for ve·ry useful connnents on an earlier version. 
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industrialization and generate revenues by g~ving heavy protection, o~ten 
using quantitative restrictions. Typically such policies lower the domes:ic 
price of exportables relative to both importables and non traded goods. 
When combined with export taxes and government marketing boards, there 
can be a very large difference between the price agricultural households 
receive for their export crops and the price they would have recieved 
without market interventions. As th~ recent report Accelerated Developmer.t 
in Sub-Saharan Africa pointed out, this pattern is common for sub-Saharan 
African economies, but it is not exclusive to them. 
A_nalyzing such policies using traditional economic tools such as 
consumers' and producers•' surplus can be quite useful as a start, al though for 
reany questions such tools may be misleading. For example, if output 
supply is elastic for an exported cash crop, because there exists substitutio~ 
possibilities withimported food crops, an increase in the export tax 
would be expected to decrease government revenues. However, if there 
is an imported food which is heavily subsidized this need not be so since 
less of the food might be imported. In order to trace out the effects 
of a higher export tax on imports of foods it is necessary ~o analyze 
the change in the marketed surplus of foods, not simply in production. 
-To do this requires predicting the changes in farm household consumption 
as well as production. The basic idea of farm household modeling is 
that the two are linked. In the example, the increase in the export 
tax should depress farm profits, which will lead the household to consume 
less food, th~s releasing to the market even more than the increment 
in food production, and in turn making a reduction in government revenues 
less likely. 
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As another example we can examine the effect of government interventior.5 
in the area of agricultural technology. What, for exa~ple, might be 
the effect of introducing a new chemical-biological technology on the 
demand for landless laborers? This has been 'debated {see for instance 
Krishna, 1975), but focus has been on the demand for total labor -- both 
family and hired. To predict the effects cf new technologies on the 
demand for hired labor requires examining what happens to family labor 
supply not just the total demand for labor. If the package increases 
farm incomes, it will lead families to supply less labor. If hired and 
family labor are perfect substitutes, demand for hired labor should ttien 
increase {decrease) by more {less) than the demand for total labor. 
In general any analysis examining the consumption or labor supply 
of agricultural households has to account for the interdependency of 
household production and consumption. Agricultural household modeling 
combines the~e two fundamental units of microeconomic analysis -- t~e 
household and the firm. The two units are linked since farm enterprise 
activities., contribute to household income, and therefore effect household 
consumption. It turns out that this more general model of household 
production and consumption can lead to results which contradict the orthodox 
demand theory. For example, a rise in output price may lead to higher, 
not lower, consumption, of a good which the household both consumes and 
produces. This may occur because demand for the good responds positively 
to income, since a rise in output price will raise farm profits and hence 
family income, some of which will be spent o.n the good whose price has 
risen. If consumption rose enough, marketed surplus of the good could 
even fall as its price increase3. 
•. 
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Under certain circumstances the only in~erdependence between the 
household and firm activities of an agricultural householtl comes through 
income. In this case the production activities of the household can 
be analyzed separately from the consumption activities, the model becoming 
split into profit maximizing and utility maximizing components. The 
traditional analysis of farm output supply and input demand using the 
theory of the firm is then valid. Empirical analysis of both household 
consumption and production becomes considerably more tractable, and as 
a result most of the empirical analyses to date have used such separable 
models. 
In a static model, the key assumption needed to obtain separation 
of the household's production and consumption decisions is that the household 
be a price taker for every commodity, including family labor, which 
.
is both cons~~ed and produced. This means that perfectly competitive markets 
must exist for each such good. Intuitively, the household can make its 
consumption and production decisions separately, since any difference 
can be bought or sold on the market at a fixed price. There exist a 
variety of reasons why separability might not hold. Market power is 
one reason, but is not typically thought to be important in farm household 
2
modeling. Absence of a market, e.g.-for labor, would violate the price 
taker assumption. More realistically, family and hired labor might be 
imperfect substitutes in production, while no family labor is sold out. 
In either of these latter two cases, we can think of a virtual, or shadow, 
price, as the price which would just equate the household demand for 
. . -
total (or family) labor with its supply. Such a price-wfil depend on 
all the variables which the household takes ·as given, those affecting 
either consumption or production. Since this virtual price of labor 
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will in turn affect both sets of decisions, there will exist another source, 
in addition to income, of interdependency. Now, farm output supply 
and input demands will depend on household preferences so that the traditior.a: 
·theory of the firm will be inappropriate to analyze them. Analytical 
results which contradict predictions from the theory of the firm can 
be obtained. For example, a rise in output price may cause a fall in 
production, if family labor supply is sufficiently lowered by the income 
increasing effect of the price rise. Holding the virtual price of family 
labor constant., the increase in output price raises the demand for family 
labor, and lowers the supply. Thus the virtual price has to rise, just 
enough to reequate the demand and supply of family labor. That rise 
in the virtual price of ·family labor, an input into production, will 
cause a reduction in output, which if greater than the initial increase 
in output will give us the counterintuitive result. To contrast, had 
the household sold some labor on the market, in additiun to working on 
its own farm, the fixed market wage would have been the appropriate price 
to use in the analysis -- the farm household model would be separable. 
Then output could never decrease when its price rose, holding·other prices 
constant, so long as the production function was well~behaved. 
There does not exist a single prototype agricultural household model, 
rather there are many such models depending on what issues are being 
examined. The implications of each model depends very much on the assumptions 
used, especially assumptions about markets and prices. 
In the rest of the chapter several theoretical models are compared 
and contrasted. In Section 2 a model is presented which assumes fixed 
market prices. The separability property and comparative statics are 
derived. The concept of a virtual price is then explicitly defined, 
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and it is shown how the response of the virtual price to exogenous variables 
can. be obtained. It will turn out that with a minimum number of assumptions 
this response can be signed. These results are then used to examine 
the comparative statics of various farm household models, when the household 
faces virtupl rather than market prices. In doing so the difference 
in the comparative statics between separable and nonseparable models 
becomes clear. Section three outlines a model in which the market for 
labor is absent. In Section~ models which incorporate Z-goods are 
discussed, while Section 5 treats models with certain types of commodity 
heterogeneity. Finally conditions under which agricultural household 
models are separable are summarized. 
-7-
2. A General Approach 
A. A Basic Model: The Household as Price Taker. 
In this section we develop a static moder in which all prices are 
taken as exogenous. Assume the household maximizes its utility subject 
to its constraints. Three constraints are specified at first: a production 
function constraint, and time and budget constraints. To date agricultural 
household models have not been used to address issues of intrafamily 
distribution, so in that spirit. a household utility function is assumed 
to exist. · Let 
be the utility function, which is well behaved: quasi-concave with positive 
partial derivatives. The arguments are household consumption of commodity 
i, with XL denoting :otal leisure tirne. 3 Utility is reaximized Subject 
to a budget constraint 
L 
y.,. I: p.X. ( 2)
1
i•l 1 
where Y is the household's full income (see equation (3)), and the p. 's 
l. 
are commodity prices (PL being the _wage rate) whtch may or may not be 
exogenous to the household. For now assume that these prices are taken 
exogenously by the household, but this assumption will be relaxed shortly. 
If full income can be taken as predetermined then the household's decision 
is the standard consumption-leisure decision. 
Full income of an agricultural household equals the value of its 
time endo,,nnent, plus the value of the household's production less the 
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value of variable inputs required for production of outputs, plus any 
non-wage, non-household production income such as remittances. 
Y. ~ 
yap T + r qJ.QJ. - r riRi - pLR_ + E_ (3) 
L j=l 1=1 --i. 
where T - time endowment 
0. - output, for j = 1 ' ... l1' J 
R. non-labor variable inputs, for i 1, ... '- = N1 
labor demandRL -
. q. - price of Q. J J 
r. - price of R. 1 l. 
E =exogenous income 
For the moment it is assumed that RL is total labor demanded by the household, 
both family and hired, which are assumed to be perfect substitutes, an 
assumption we will relax in Section D. Outputs and inputs are related 
by an implicit production function 
( 4) 
where K.'s are fixed inputs. This is a general specification which allows 
1 
for separate production functions for different outputs, or for joint 
production. G is assumed to satisfy the usual properties for production 
functions: it is quasi-convex, increasing in outputs and decreasing 
in inputs. If the household maximizes utility (1) subject to its budget 
(2 and 3) and production function (4) constraints and to prices (p,q,r) 
being fixed, then the household's choices can be modeled as two separate 
decisions, even though the decisions are simultaneous in time (Nakajima, 
1969; Jorgenson and Lau, 1969).. The household behaves as though it maximizes 
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the revenue side of its full income, equatio~ (3), subject to its production 
function constraint, and then maximizes utility subject to its full income 
constraint, equation (2). Since neither the value of endowed time nor 
exogenous income are household choice variables, maximizing full income 
is equivalent to maximizing the value of outputs less variable inputs, 
or profits. 
To see that the model is separable between revenue and expenditure 
the comparative statics are examined. Let the household consume three 
4
commodities: leisure, XL; a good which is purchased on the market, Xm; 
and a good, Xe' produced by the hous~hold. The household uses labor, 
RL' another variable input, Rv' and a fixed input K to produce both Qc_ 
and another crop, Q. All cf Q is sold on the market (a cash crop).s s 
The Lagrange function can be written as 
£ = U(Xl,x ,x) + A(pLT + (q Q +p Q -pLRL-r R ) + E - pLXT. - pmXm• m c ss cc vv _ 
- p X) + µG(O ,O ,RL,R ,K) (5) 
C C S C V 
Assuming interior solutions, the first order conditions arei 
a.t 
- .. UL - >..pL .. 0 (6)aXr. 
ai. 
- • U - ;..p • 0- ax c . c 
C 
p (T-X.. -R_ ) + q Q + p (Q -X ) - r R - pmXm + E = 0L -L -L s S C C C V V 
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1 c).:- + 1:! ,.. = 0 
\ cl Q = qs >. "s 
s 
1 a~-- --· = -p + 1::. G = 0
A cl~ L A L 
Totally differentiating (6) 
0 0 0 Adp0 0 d~ULL ULm .ULc -pL· 1 
0 0 dX Adpu u -p 0 0 0 m IrumL mm me m 
.o dX :\.dp-u u u -p 0 0 0 0 C CcL cm cc C 
0 0 0 0 0 dA 1jJ-p. -p -p 0
L m C 
µ 1J 1::. G G dQ = -dq (7)0 0 0 0 .\1- G -GA 'I GsL A SV s s s" ss SC 
.!:!.c J:!.G J:!. G .!:!. G G dQ -dq0 0 0 0 )._ cs )._ cc A cL A CV C C C 
lJ 1J l.l lJ
0 0 .0 0 T GLL T GLV GL dl\. dpLT GLs T GLc 
~G J:!. G lJ .£ G t:R dr0 0 0 0 A VS )._ vc T GvL )._ vv G V V V 
d (µ)0 0 0 G G G 0 0GL _)._ 
- V; s C 
Is obtajned, 5 
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= which car. beThis system of equations is of the form [~11 0 rli [::]A22 lb2
[A-1 c,l1  
C • The first set of equations, corresponding tosolved as = A-1[::] 22 2 
the upper left block of the bordered Hessian matrix, gives the solution 
The seconcfor commodity demands and the marginal utility of full income. 
set of equations gives the solution fer output supplies, variable input
 
demands and the associated multiplier. The assumptions concerning the 
utility and production functions insures that second order conditions 
are met. Hence the two decision~problems can indeed be solved for separa
tely, 
despite their simultaneity in time. This characteristic of separabilit
y 
has been an essential characteristic of most empirical studies to date,
 
because of the computational tractability it affords {see Chapter 2). 
Separation notwithstanding equation. 17) demonstrates the principal 
message of the farm household literature, that farm technology, quantit
ie~ 
of fixed inputs, and prices of variable inputs and of outputs do affect
 
consumption decisions. Given separation, however, the reverse is not 
true. Preferences, prices of consumption com.'nodi ties, and in,coz::ie do not
 
affect production decisions. Output supply responds positively to own 
price at all times due to the quasi-convexity assumption on the product
ion
ao ..n · 
function, aqs = -J! > o, where n is the determinant of the bordered 
s 
Hessian matrix corresponding to A22 and 
n11 is the cofactor of t
he first 
, will affectrow and column. Changes in the price of the cash crop, q5 
consumption of the purchased commodity, X,m through cha
nged income. 
L 0 k ~ h
t . '") ·t b that aQ:aXro QS aXmdt, • 1 ew.se C angesFrom equa 10n \/. l can e seen 
s 
in quantities of fixed input~, X, will affect income, hence consumption
 of 
axm d. .X •. .._-axm - .ld. G. __ • Assuming Xm is a normal corr.mo 1 ty, 1ncremen
t s 
mi a K. - A 1C 3E 
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to fixed inputs and to output prices of cash crops will induce higher 
consumption of X. For commodities which are also produced by the m 
household, own price effects are 
( 8) 
Thus a change in price of Xe has the usual negative substitution effect, 
and an income effect which is weighted by net sales (or marketed surplus) 
of Xe' not consumption of Xe. The income effect is positive for a 
net seller ?nd negative for a net buyer. In consequence, for net 
sellers, consumption of X might respond positively to changes in 
C 
its own price even though X is a normal good.
C 




as compared to the pure consuming household. This extra effect 
results from the profits component of full income being·raised, hence 
can be referred to as a "profits effect". To see this note that from 
equation (3) dY = TdpL + dn + dE where TI - profits, the value of outputs 
less the value of variable inputs. Also from equation (3) and the 
first order conditions 
(see footnotes.). Substituting into equation (7) the fourth element 
is derived as ¢ = - (T - X_ ) dpL + X dp + X dp- - dTI -dE in the right-"L m m c c 
ax ax ax 
C C C (Sa)ap = ~-Xe IT 
C TI Cu . 
-13-




a1rSince -a-= Q, from above, the extra effect does indeed come through
Pc C 
charging farm profits. The comparative status for leisure are similar, 
( 9) 
The income effect is weighted by household labor supply minus labor 
demand (marketed surplus of labor), not by household labor supply. 
Assuming that leisure is a normal good this makes a backward bending 
supply curve less likely than if the household were solely a supplier 
of labor. 
B. Deriving Virtual (Shadow) Prices 
To explore the consequences of making prices endogenous to the 
household it will be convenient to use duality results to express 
the equilibrium of the household. We can define the full income function 
as the maximization of equation (3) with respect to outputs and variable 
inputs subject to the production function, (4),and can write 
y = A(q ,P ,PL,r ,K1T,E) = pLT + n(q ,P ,PL,r ,K)+ E (10)
S C V S C V 
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Clearly the full income functio~ can be written as the su~ of the value c: 
endowed time, a restricted (or short run). profits function and exogenous 
income. The profits function has the usual properties such as being 
convex in all prices. For the expenditure side of full income we 
can define an expenditure function as the minimum expenditure (equation 21 
required to meet a specified level of utility, e(pL,P ,P ,U). It obeysm C 
the usual properties, in particul~r it is concave in prices, and the partia: 
derivatives with respect to price are the Hicksian (compensated) demand 
functions.· 
Now'we are in a position to relax our assumption ·that prices 
are fixed market prices. The household's equilibrium is characterized 
by equality between the household's full income function, A, and its 
expenditure function, e, where the expenditure function is evaluated 
at the ~tility level achieved at the household's optimum. This condition 
will hold whether or not households face given market prices. Now 
suppose that a household is constrained to equate consumption with 
production for some commodity(ies). One possible reason for this 
would be nonexistence of a market. Consequently the hou~ehold's equilibriu~ 
will be characterized by a set of additional conditions -- equality 
of household demand and household supply for each commodity for which 
there is hO market (~ixit and Norman, 1980).6 This second set of 
equilibrium conditions implicitly defines a set of virtual prices 
-ot'shadow prices, see footnote 1.5--(Neary and Roberts, 1980; Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980, Chapter 4.3; Sicular, this volume), v1hich if 
they existed would induce the household to equate supply and demand 
for these commodities. 
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These virtual prices are not fixed for the household as market 
prices are assumed to be. Rather they are determined by the household's 
choices. From the household's equ_ilibrium it can be seen that they 
will be a function of rr.arket prices, time endowment, fixed inputs, 
and either exogenous income or utility. 7 Consequently these prices 
depend on both the household's preferences and its production technology. 
Changes in market prices will now affect behavior directly, as before, 
and indirectly through changes in the virtual prices. Some mechanism 
of identifying the consequences of this additional effect ~s therefore 
needed in order to illuminate the significance of one's assumptions 
regarding price formation. That mechanism will be the comparative 
statics of the virtual price, which will now be developed. 
To be specific, suppose, for the moment arbitrarily, that there 





er (p*L,P ,P,..,Ul = T + n1 (q ,P ,p*L,r ,Kl w m ... , S C V 
where eL = ~~* and likewise ~L =~~~ . 
L PL 
The second equation gives the Hicksian leisure demand on the left 
hand side and time endowr.1ent minus labor tiemand on the right. From 
this equation pf ,the compensated virtual price,can be solved for 
as 
PL*= p*(p ,P ,q ,r ,K,Ui (12)
L m C S V 
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Note th&t the utility level is being held constant, and not exogenous 
can_ be set equal to time mint.Slabor demand,and a solution obtained: 
(13)p* = L 
To relate the functions Pt and Pt a somewhat different "expenditure" 
function is needed. Let 
e'(pL,P ,P ,q ,r ,K,T,U) = min m C S V 
(14) 
st U(.) =U and G(.) =O 
This represents the minimum exogenous income, E, necessary to achieve 
utility level U,given the production function and prices. It is clear that 
e' meets all the conditions which a regular expenditure function does, 
a'ld that 
In equation ~13), if exogenous income Eis evaluated ate' (hence full 
income, Y, ate) then Marshallian leisure demand equals the Hicksian demand 
and Pt= Pf• Using this equality 
-
aP* ao* L L oe' (16)+---az aE az 
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With utility constant the respon~e of the virtual price can be 
expressed in terms of second partial derivati~es of the expenditure 
and profit functions. Using the implicit function rule and equation 
. ( 11} 
p ,P ,q ,r ,K (17} 
m C S V 
The denominator is unambiguously negative due to the concavity of 
the expenditure function and the ~onvexity of the profits function. 
The numerator can be either sign, but often the sign will be determinate 
if one is willing to assume that commodities are substitutes or comple~en~s 
in consumption or production. fer instance if Z = p the numerator 
m 
is -eLm' which is negative if leisure and Xm are substitutes. If 
X = pc the numerator is nLc - eLc" The first term is the response 
of output of X to wage, which should be negative. The second term 
C 
is negative if leisure and X are substitutes. For an input price,
C 
rv' the numerator is nLv which can be positive or negative depending 
on whether labor and input R are gross substitutes or complements.
V 
·Equation (17) is a basic result which will be repeatedly used 
in subsequent •discussion to illuminate the effects of totally or partly 
absent markets. It allows one to sign the partial derivatives of 
the compensated virtual price, making this device of use in looking 
at the comparative statics. Moreover it allows one to directly compare 
models which make differing assumptions concerning the nature of prices 
which the household faces. 
-The sign of the response of the compensated virtual price, Pf, 
to exogenous variables can be given a very intuitive interpretation. 
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If for instance the price of the cash crop rises, the demand schedule 
for labor should shift upwards. Given that other market prices, fixed 
inputs, and utility are constant, the virtual wage has to rise in 
order to reequate compensated labor supply with demand. Such a rise 
will low~r labor demand along the new schedule, while raising compensated, 
or Hicksian, labor supply. 
As should be clear, whether prices are exogenous for commodities 
which are both consumed and produced by the household affects the 
type of interdependency between the household's consumption and production 
choices. For such commodities the virtual prices are functions of 
both household preferences and_ production technology. Because these 
prices help to determine both consumption and production choices~-they 
belong in both the expenditure and the full income functions-·-the 
household commod1ty demands will depend on production technology both 
through the _virtual price and through full income. Output supplies 
and input demands will depend on preferences through the virtual price. 
If, however, the household faces only market prices, or if it faces 
a virtual price for a commodity which is consumed but not produced 
(or vice versa), then production choices will not depend on household 
p~eferences, but consumption choices will depend on production technology 
through full income. The model is then separable. 
3. Models With Absent Markets: Labor 
I~ the historical development of agricultural household models 
partially autarkic behavior has been very important. One of the earliest 
8
models can be traced to the Russian economist A. V. Chayanov (1925). 
He was concerned with explaining Russian peasant households' allocation 
of labor between work and leisure given his observation that virtually 
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no hired labor was used in farm production activities. He recognized 
that such households were not simply maximizing profits as in the 
theory of the firm, rather they ha~ a "~ubjective equilibrium" in 
which they equated the marginal utility of household consumption with 
the marginal utility of leisure. His analysis was embellished by 
a group of Japanese economists, including Tanaka (1951) and Nakajima 
(1957), during the 1950.'s and 60's. Nakajima (1969) in particular 
gave the model currency among English-speaking economists. He gave 
a mathematical formulation to Chay-anov's model, and proposed some 
additional ones as well. Nakajima's model of a pure commercial family 
farm without a labor market (Nakajima, 1969) assumed that households 
sold all of their output, and purchased commodities from the market, 
while producing the output with family labor and a fixed amount of 
land. In this paper's notation he assumed Xe= Oc = Rv = 0 and 
= T - RL. He also allowed for the possibility of a minimum subsistencec1 
consumption requirement as well as a target income. In a different 
version (his semi-subsistencefamily farm) he allows the family to 
consume some of its output, and in another version introduces two 
outputs. Similar models of "peasant" households were advanced by 
Mellor (1963) and Sen (1966) and by economic anthropologists such 
as Fisk and Shand (1969). These models are thus special cases of 
the general form of the agricultural household model developed in 
Section 2. 
One major use of these models in which the family supplied 
all of its labor was to explore the effects on labor supply (hence 
on labor demand, and on output sinc·e labor was assumed to be the only 
variable input) of changes in different variables. The effect of 
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output price was of particular interest because of the seemingly perversE 
possibility that output might respond negatively to output price. 
This might occur if the income effect, resulting in more leisure demand, 
were large enough. Na~ajima showed that an. exogeno~G increase in land input 
might also reduce output, because it too would have an income effect 
on leisure. Nakajima separated the response of labor supply to output 
price into substitution and income effects, showing that the income 
compensated response of labor supply to output price was positive. 
Sen showed the possibility of a n~gative output response to output 
price,. as well as the possibility of no output response to the withdrawal 
of family workers. The latter might occur if the remaining family 
laborers worked sufficiently hard to offset the reduced number of 
hours worked as workers were withdrawn. This in turn required that 
the virtual wage (or its ratio to output price, Sen's real cost of 
labor) be constant, which would be the case in Sen's model if the 
marginal utilities of both income and leisure were roughly constant. 
· The possibility of a negative response of labor demand (and 
of output supply) to output price at the household level is dependent 
on the constrained equality of labor demand and labor supply. 9 If 
m&rkets exist for all commodities then the model is separable and 
labor demand will respond positively to output.price so long as it 
is not an inferior input. Nakajima noted this when discussing his 
model with a labor market and a cash crop. Both Jorgenson and Lau 
(1969) and Krishna (1964, 1969) proposed separable semi-subsistence 
models in which labor is marketed and output is partially consumed 
at home. Jorgenson and Lau's pape~ has b~en particularly influential, 
forming the basis en which most of the empirical work to date has 
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been conducted. 
The difference which absence of a labor market makes to the 
comparative statics of leisure and commodity demand can easily be 
seen by using the notion of a virtual wage. Write the Marshallian 
demand as X.{p*L·,p ,P ,p*1 T+ TI(q ,p ,p*,r ,K) + E). Differentiate this l ·me ... SC 1 V 
with respect to q to obtain s 
-ax ax. 
i + Q. 1 (18)
C, --:,;--y i = L, M aq. ., 0 
s 
Output price has two ~ffects on the demand for leisure or for the market 
purchased good: it has an income effect by changing profits (the 
second term), and it changes the virtual price for labor. Clearly 
when the household is a price taker in the labor market the latter 
effect is zero. 
Equation (18) can be decomposed into substitution and income 
effec;s, which will help in signing the uncompensated chaP.ges in the 
demand for leisure and the market purchased comrnodi ty. F ).rs t, it 
can be shown that the uncompensated effect with respect to the virtual 
wage equals the compensated effect. To do this it will be useful to 
equate Marshallian and Hicksian demands by evaluating full income, Y, 
at e aud the virtual wage at Pt (i.e. both holding utility constant). 
i = L,M (19) 
Differentiating both sides of (19) with respect to the cash crop price, qs, 
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and since labor supply equals labor demand, so that XL=T-RL' it can 
r\Xi ?X9 
be shown (using equation (20)) that - = --1 Thus the income effect 
ao* on*·L ·L 
of a change 5.n the virtual wage equals zero, which is intuitive sirce 
the net marketed surplus is zero when no labor market exists. 
ap*. 
The term d~ in equation _(18) can be made more transparent by 
s ap* a~ ap*
noting from (16) that L L L, (recall thatO7q:"' = dq + s ~ 
s s 
ae'~· = -0 ). When this is substituted into (18) one obtains 
qs s 
i = L,M (22) 
i = L,M (22al 
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Equations (22) and (22a) show the decomposed income and substitutior: 
effects. They also clarify the significance cf one's view regarding 
the labor market. If the labor market does exist then the household 
faces market prices so the substitution effect (the first term in 
(22a)) is zero and the entire effect of the change in output price 
ax. 
is captured by the income effect (Qs --
1 
) • This is positive providingaY 
are normal goods. When the laborleisure or the purchased commodity 
market is absent there is a substitution effect caused by the change 
in the income compensated virtual wage. Using equation (17) canwe 
rewrite this substitution effect as, 
i = L,M (23) 
If the compensated virtual wage rises (that is if in equation (23), 
nLS < 0), then there is a substitution away from leisure·or towards 
the purchased commodity (if it is a substitute for leisure). The 
i.ncome effect comes in two parts, first a traditional looking income 
effect and second a substitution-type effect due to an induced change 
in the·uncompensated virtual wage, p*L.lO From equation (22) we can see 
clp* 
that when leisure is normal, aEL > o, the income effect is scaller for 
leisure and larger for purchased goods {assuming substitut~ability 
with leisure) when the labor market does not exist than when it does 
exist. An incr·ease in exogenous income raises the uncompensated virtual 
wage which induces a substitution away fr.om leisure or towards the 
purchased commodity. 
-24-
Presuming that the entire income effect is positive,the net effect 
of a rise in output price gs on leisure is indetermiAant, while it 
will be positive for the purchased commodity. This is the same result, 
of course, as is obtained by both Nakajima (1969) and Sen (1966). 
Some analysts (e.g. Barnum and Squire, 1980) have argued that since 
the income effect is weighted by output, Os~ it ought to outweigh 
the substitution effect, so that leisure (labor supply) should respond 
positively (negatively) to changes in output price. Of course this 
is an empirical question. Using similar reasoning would imply that 
landless households should possess backward bending supply curves 
since the income effect in that case is weighted by labor supply. 
Clearly such an assertion is an overgeneralization, and depends on 
empirical parameters. The point is there is little guidance to the 
size of the substitution effect. 
A. Output Response 
If labor is the only variable input then the sign of output 
response to output price must be the opposite to the leisure response. 
·More generally we can write output supply Os as Os - an - aqs 
consequently 
(24) 
The first term is the output supply response when the virtual wage is 
fixed, and is positive. The second term is negative assuming that 
output responds negatively to the virtual wage (nsL<O), so that the sign 
. of the entire expression is· indeterminant. It is possible to show 
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. . t· 11
that holding household utility const~1t the response 1s posi 1ve. 
ap~
Substituting for_!:: from eouation (16)aqs . 
ap°*
= (n + 1T L) + (25)ss sL~s 
The first two terms are the response of output supply holding utility 
constant. The.third term is an income effect, which is negative if 
nsL is. rhe second term equals n;L/(eLL - TILL) so it is negative. 




the function e' (equation (15)) is concave in. prices, so that 
. 2 
0a2e' 32e' - l'"'2e, 0 Straightforward algebra shows that
aq 2· a.Pr,:'. dqscrpI - • 
this expression is simply the first two terms in equation (25) multipl1ed 




a negative output response, will be influenced by the number of variable 
inputs and the partial elasticity of substitution between labor and 
these other inputs.· Presumably the more inputs and the more substitutable 
they are, the less negative nsL will be and the more likely will be a 
positive response to output price. Clearly when the virtual wage 
is exogenous to the household, output response will be positive, and. 
greater than when virtual wage is endogenous. 
If .the household consumes some of the output whose price is 
changing, Qc' the comparative statics have an additional substitution 
effect, and the income effect is weighted by net output sold (marketed 
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surplus) and not by total output. 
i = L,M, C (26) 
api
Again using equ_ation (17), ap~ = (ncL - ecL)/(eLL - TILL) which is positive 
if Q
C 
and leisure are substitutes. Deriving the comparative statics as 
before one finds 
+ __ax.l(Q i = L,M,CaYC 
(27a) 
The substitution effect for leisure demand can be of either sign. It 
is not necessarily positive, even if Xe and leisure are substitutes 
holding the virtual wage constant. The income compensated response 
of Xe can also be of either sign when the wage is virtual, since an 
increase in the price, pc' will increase the compensated virtual wage 
leading to a substitution toward X. Clearly the substitution effectC 
for Xe will be less negative than when the labor·market exists, analogous 
to the result obtained by Neary and Rober-ts (1980) for the pure rationing 
case. The income effect has an extra term, which for Xe and Xm is 
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positive if leisure is a substitute and is negative for leisure demand. 
D. Marketed Surplus Response 
If we examine the response of marketed surplus of Xe' Qc-X~, 
to changes in p
C 
we obtain from (25), (16) and (27) 
axe 
= Pf ap*L 
C 
ap*
L ax l (28)oY cw-
The first four terms -(in brackets) hold utility constant, and therefore 
comprise the substitution effect. It is straightforward to.see that this 
effect equals 
2 ,.2 I ,_2 I
~ ti e .sWL
2 








(remember that e' is concave in prices). The last term equals 
<o -x )[ aoc - ~ 1 and so is the income effec·t, which should 
. - C C aE aE 
be negative if marketed surplus is positive and X is a normal good.. C 
Consequently marketed surplus of Xe might respond positively or negatively 
to increases in its owr. price. Comparing this result with that when 
the labor market exists, one can see that the extra substitution effects 
-28-
will be negative if X and leisure are substitutes since the compensatec
C 
virtual wage will then rise. The extra income effects should also 
be negative, so that a greater possibility exists of obtaining a negative 
own price response of marketed surplus of Xe. 
The comparative statics with respect to changes in pm' rv' 
Kand Tare very similar to equation (22), the response of the compensated 
virtual wage being different as ~s the term weighting the income effect. 
Specific formulae are left for the interested reader to derive. 
4. Models With Absent Markets: Z-Goods 
It should be ~lear that which market one assumes not to exist 
does not affect the foregoing argument. HenGe the existence of a 
labor market is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agricultural 
household model to be separable. All markets must exist for separability 
(though this is not a sufficient condition see section 5). It 
happens that historically it was the labor market that economists 
thought was least likely to exist for peasant farms. That view has 
been changing, however. Active rural labor markets have.been found 
to exist according ~o several recent studies (Squire, 1981; Bardhan, 
1979; Rosenzweig, 1978; Spencer and Byerlee, 1977; Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, forthcoming) although not necessarily perfectly competitive 
ones. More recently there has been focus on.the nonexistence of a 
market for so-called Z-goods. This was first formalized by Hymer 
and Resni~k (1969) who refer to Z-goods as-no~-agricultural, non-leisure 
activities. In general the commodities Hymer and Resnick refer to, 
such as food processing and metal working, are commodities for which 
scale rural industries have been found to exist by recent investiga:orssmall 
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(Anderson and Leiserson, 1980; and Liedholm and Chuta, 1976). However 
Z-goods equally as well refer to nontraded outputs of household productio" 
activities such as the number and quality of children, home maintenance 
or food preparation. In this way the household production models 
of Becker (1965) and Gronau (1973, 1977) can be incorporated into 
agricultural household models. 
Hymer and Resnick were concerned with the increasing specialization 
of agricultural household activities which they saw as occuring over 
time, resulting in an increasing marketed surplus from agricultural 
households·. Rather than focus on the leisure-labor tradeoff they 
focused on the Z-goods-food tradeoff. In terms of the general model 
in section 2, households produce foods, 0,C whi
ch they consume, and 
sell the surplus in exchange for manufactured commodities, X. Theym 
produce ~-goods, our RL, which they consume entirely at home, RL = 
XL. Labor supply did not enter their moJel, but implicitly it is 
assumed to be fixed in amount and equal to labor demand, thus it is 
not a choice variable. In terms of this model labor is one of the 
fixed inputs, K, and it does not appear in the utility function.
12 
There are no other variable inputs, RV = O, nor does ther
e exist a 
cash crop, O ·= O. These assumptions imply that the product transformations 
curve between foods and Z-goods has the usual-downward-sloping, concave 
shape. Consequently to find the sign of the effect of a change in 
the price of foods, pc' on output of foods only the effect on demand
ax
(hence supply) of Z-goods needs to be considered. That is~ isope 
wanted, which is given by our equation (27). The substitution effect 
can be of either sign. If Z-goods.and foods are substitutes a rise 
in food prices will increase Z-goods consumption, holding the compensated 
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virtual price of Z-goods constant. However, this will force up the 
virtual price leading to a substitution away from Z-gaods consumption. 
The income·effect is weighted by the marketed surplus of foods, presumed 
to be positive. Hymer and Resnick assume that Z-goods consumption 
is inferior and that the combined substitution effect is small so 
that the net effect of a rise in foods price will be a fall in Z-goods 
consumption (and production), hence a rise in food production. 
Of course if foods are consumed by the household the food consumption 
response to food price needs to be examined before what happens to 
marketed surplus of foods can be judged. As seen from equation (28) 
marketed surplus of food can either rise or fall in response to an 
increase in food pri~e, provided the household has a positive marketed 
surplus and Z-goods are normal (so apf > O}. However, if Z-goodscm-- . 
are inferior ther! its virtual price falls when exogenous. income rises 
so that production of foods rises and compensated consumption of foods 
falls (provided foods and Z-gcods are substitutes), making i't more 
likely that the response of marketed surplus is positive: 
The Hymer and Resnick assumption that leisure and labor demand 
are not choice variables can be relaxed. Let the production of Z­
go~ds be Oz' which equals consumption, Xz. Leisure is again denoted 
by XL and labor demand RL and 0 = 0. If it is assumed that no labor 
8 
market exists then two virtual prices exist, one for labor and one 
for Z-goods. There are thus two equality constraints on supply and 
demand rather than one. Using the implicit function rule and the 
fact that e' (equation (15)) is a concave function of prices it can 
be shown that the compensated virtual prices of both Z-goods and labor 




leisure and Z-goods are all Hicks-substitutes, and provided labor 
demand rises and Z-goods output falls whe~ food price rises, holding 
virtual prices constant. A rise in p holding the two virtual pricesC 
constant raises compensated consumption of both leisure and Z-goods, 
raising labor demand and lowering Z-goods output. A combination of 
a rise in the price of Z-goods and labor can restore equilibrium in 
both markets. Considering changes in the marketed surplus of food 
when food price changes there are now two extra substitution effects 
and two extra income effects when labor is a choice variable. Under 
the current assumptions a rise in food price leads to a rise in the 
compensated virtual wage which lowers food production and raises food 
. 13 
The extra income•consumption, thereby lowering marketed surplus. 
effects come through higher income raising the uncompensated virtual 
wage (since leisure is normal) which again should lower food production 
and ra:se food consumption. In particular the income effect~~ raising 
the virtual wage counters the income effect of lowering the virtual 
Z-goods price (assuming again that Z-goods are inferior) as Barnum 
and Squire (1979, p. 36) argue. 
Finally the labor market can be allowed to exist, but not the 
Z-goods market. The response of marketed food surplus to changes 
in food p~ice is given again by equation (28), interpreting pf 
as the Z-goods virtual price. Now, however, the price of labor, not 
its quantity, is being held constant in the expenditure and full income 
functions. Thus the magnitude of the terms ·will be different from 
the fixed labor situation. In particular the cross price terms are 
likely to be smaller as is the change in the compensated virtual price, 
cP*L • For example Z-goods production need not go down by as muchrp-
c 
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(or at all) when food price increases since demand for labor and 
other variable inputs will likely rise. 14 · This should occur since 
labor demand should rise as food production rises (holding the virtual 
pric~ constant), and it will rise further in response to the rise 
in the compensated virtual price of Z-goods. The income effect on 
the virtual price of Z-goods would further add to labor demand if 
Z-goods were normal, however, under the inferiority assumption labor 
demand would be dampened. 
Of C?urse if both Z-goods and labor markets exist so that virtual 
prices are fixed, food output will respond positively to food price. 
Then food marketed surplus will only respond negatively to price if 
food consumption responds more positively (because of a large income 
effect) than does production. 
As an alternative to the Hymer and Resnick interpretation Z­
goods might be interp~eted as being synonymous with household production 
activities. The original work of Becker (1965),.Lancaster (1966), 
and Muth (1966) emphasizes that the commodities which yie~d household 
utility are produced within the household by goods purchased in the 
In terms of this general model X is a vectormarket and by labor. . C 
of commodities consumed and produced in the home. Market purchased 
inputs ~re denoted by Rv (Xm = 0), and labor demand, RL, is a vector 
of time allocated to the production of each commodity. Leisure usually 
is not considered so total time is the sum of time spent in ho~sehold 
production, plus market work. 15 
One of the major uses to which the household production approach 
has been put is to model.the demand for the quantity (and quality) 
of children. Rosenzweig (1977) has applied such a model to ag~icultural 
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households· The primary interest in these motle)_s is in ex?laining 
the comparative statics of child demand and education. The effect 
of agricultural production (or market work opportunities) is to reduce 
the shadow price of children, since they work on the farm and possibly 
on the market (this ignores possible quantity-quality tradeoffs, e.g., 
Rosenzweig, 1982}, Changes in male and female wages now affect the 
shadow price of children through substitution among farm production 
inputs as well as through the child production function~ 
An elaboration of the household production framework by Gronau (19i3) 
provides results almost identical to the model of Hymer and Resnick. Gronau's 
model amounts to rela!>eling food consumption as leisure and food production 
as labor demand. He too has a market purchased and a home produced 
(Z) commodity, with home production using labor and purchased inputs. 
Like the Hymer and Resnick model, a virtual price exists for the home 
produ:ed (Z) good. If no labor is supplied to the market there will 
exist a virtual (shadow) wage as well, and the analysis is comparable 
to the·Hymer and Resnick model when labor is a choice variable but 
., 
no market for it exists. In a later paper Gronau (1977) assumes that 
the market purchased and the household produced com.'Tlodities are perfect 
substitutes in consumption and so may be added. So long as market 
purchases are positive and labor is sold on the market this model 
is separable. If labor is not sold on the market a virtual (shadow) 
price for labor exists and if market purchases of the home produced . 
16
commodity are zero a virtual price for it exists. Huffman and Lange 
(1982) have a slightly different version of Gronau's model in which 
the household is explicitly an agricultural household. The household 
jointly produces a farm and a household commodity (\ and Xe), selling 
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the former and consuming the latter. Labor is sold on the market, 
but the only market purchases are for production inputs. A virtual 
price exists for the household commodity and the model is not separable. 
If, however, the farm and household commodities had separate production 
functions and fixed inputs could only be allocated to one enterprise, 
the model would be separable between farm production decisions and 
the rest. 
5. Partly Absent Markets: Commodity Heterogeneity 
-Even if all markets exist households may face a virtual price 
which depends on both production technology and household preferences, 
so that again an agricultural household model would not be separable. 
This can occur because markets are partly absent or because of institutior.ally 
imposed constraints {see Sicular, this volume, for an analysis of 
~uch constraints imposed on a production team in the Feoples Republic 
of China). In particular a household may be able to sell a commodity 
but not buy it, or vice versa. If this commodity is both consumed 
and produced by the household then the household's optimum.may be 
at a-corner at which consumption equals production. Such corner solutions 
are especially likely to occur when commodities are heterogeneous. For example, 
hired and family labor may be imperfect substitutes because of extra 
On-farm and off-farm labormonitoring or search costs of hired labor. 
may give different levels of disutility (see Lopez, this volume). 
Alternatively a commodity consumed out of home production may have 
a different quality than the same commodity purchased on the market, 
resulting in differing sales and p~rchase_ prices. 
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Households can sell and consume family labor or home productior., 
but they can not purchase them. This raises the possibility that . 
at the market price supply might be less than demand, which is not 
possible. For such corner solutions the commodity in question has 
a virtual price which would equate supply and demand. The virtual 
price will be higher than the market price provided that compensated 
marketed surplus responds positively to price. 
If households have preferences between on-farm and off-farm 
labor, then even if hired and family labor are perfect substitutes 
in product~on there may exist excess supply of on-farm labor at the 
market wage, in which ·case the virtual wage will be lower. 
It should be clear that the comparative statics for these 
I 
equilibria are identical to those considered earlier for the cases 
in which.no market exists. Also, if these corner solutions are not 
birding then the model is separable, the market prices being the opportunity 
costs. This will complicate empirical work since, if such ~eterogeneity 
exists, a sample is likely to include both households at.corners and. 
households at interior solutions. 
6. Summary 
~his chapter has reviewed some basic, static agricultural household 
models. A key modeling issue is under what circumstances a model 
is separable. This is very important for applied empirical work since 
it makes·the problem far more tractable (see Chapter 2). It has been 
shown that a sufficient condition for separability is that all markets 
exist for commodities which are both prod~ced and consumed, with the 
household being a price taker in each one, and that such commodities 
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be homogeneous. So long as households can. buy or sell as much as 
they want at given prices, production and ·consumption decisions can 
be treated as if they were sequential, production decisions being 
made first, even though they may be made simultaneously. Such strong 
conditions are not necessary, however. In particular, the homogeneity 
assumption can be dropped. However, in this case the agricultural 
household model remains separable-only if the household does not choose 
to be at a.corner for a commodity which it both produces and consumes 
(for example, consuming all of its output). If a corner solution 
is chosen, then a virtual price exists, which is a function of both 
preferences and technology, so that the household's decision is no 
longer separable. Note that even in the case·of heterogeneity, it 
is still necessary to assume that all markets exist and that prices 
be given to households to achieve separability. If even one market does 
not exist (for a commodity which is consumed and produced), then separa­
17bility between consumption and oroduction decisions breaks no,:.m. 
Historically,nonseparable agricultural household models were 
thought to be relevant, primarily because labor markets were presumed 
not to exist. As more has been learned about rural labor markets 
in developing countries this assumption has become increasingly questioned. 
This does not mean that empirically relevant models have to be separable, 
but the reasons for nonsepa~ability need to be clearly spelled out. 
It very well may be that reasons having to. do with commodity heterogeneity 
are more iiaportant empirically than complete absence of markets. 
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Footnotes 
1This definition can be traced to Krishna, 1969. 
2This reveals a gap between the fa~ household literature and th
e 
literature on share tenancy and market j_nterlinkages, in whic
h market 
power may play a role. 
3Clearly the X.'s can be a vector of commodity consumption for
 differ-
1 
ent members of the family as well. For instance we might wa
nt~ to include 
male, female or children's leisure time separately. We could
 also allow 
household characteristics such as number of members to enter 
the utility 
function separately. So long as these are viewed as fixed th
is will not 
change the analysis. 
4obviously all these scalars could just as well be vectors. 
5Wben differentiaitng the budget constraint we have substituted -
f(G/\ s dQs 
This equals ~kdK since G(·)=O.+G dQ +G1dR.._+G
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6nixit and Norman use these conditions to characterize an econ
omy under 
autarky. 
7They will also be a function of fixed household characterist
ics if 
these are introduced into the model. 
8see J. Millar (1970) for a reinterpretation._ 
9At the market level labor demand might respond negatively to
 output 
price if wage is bid up sufficiently (see Barnum and Squire, 
1980). 
lOThis two part income effect is identical to equation (24) o
f Neary 




See Lopez (1980) for a somewhat different demonstration of this. 
12 1 · 1eisure enter he utility as a • factor,A ternat1.ve1y can t fixed 
similar to other fixed household characteristics such as household size. 
and age distribution. In this case the expenditure function will include 
leisure as a conditioning variable just as a short run cost or profit 
function includes fixed inputs. 
13other terms in the substitutimeffect such as and 
aq
a; will be 
PL 
changing magnitude compared to the sltuation of fixed labor· supply. 
14 . clpt
This assumes -a- is positive, which it would not be. if r:1c - eLc > O. pc 
15rt is often assumed that Z-goods production is not joint and that it 
exhibits constant returns .to scale. If there exist no fixed inputs the 
supply (and profit) functions will be ill-defined so that shadow (or 
of equality between householdimplicit) prices cannot be defined in terms 
supply and demands. Rather they are defined implicitly by the partial deri­
vatives of the cost functions with respect to output (Pollak and Wachter, 
1975). However if fixed inputs do exist,. or the production functions 
are strictly convex, shadow (or virtual) prices can be implicitly defined 
from the equality of household demand and supply functions. 
16tf the.household could sell its home produced commodity on the market 
as well as buy it then the market price would be the shadow price (assuming 
that quality adjusted sales and purchase prices were identical) even if pur­
chases were zero. Likewise if the household could hire labor which was a 
perfect substitute for its own labor then the shadow wage would be the 
market wage even if market supply were zero. 
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17With multiple outputs it is possible for a subset of production 
decisions to be separable from other production and consumption decisions. 
This could occur if the production functions were nonjoint (separate), 
and if there was no fixed factor which had to be allocated to the differ­
ent product'ion activities. An example might be household and farm pro­
duction. With no market for the household good, household production 
.and consumption decisions are not separable, but they might be jointly 




Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture, 1980a 
Selected Developing Countries 





Sierra Leone 65 
Haiti 74 
All Middle Income Economies 44 
Egypt· 50 






8 From Table 21,World Bank, World Development Report
1983. Low income economies are those with a 1981
per capita income of less than US$410. Middle income
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